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Article 2

ALASKA
George R. Lyle, Adam D. Harki, and Traci N. Bunkers1
I. LEGISLATION
The First Regular Session of the thirty-first Alaska
Legislature began on January 15, 2019, and ended on May 15, 2019.
A First Special Session was held from May 16, 2019, through June
13, 2019, with a Second Special Session following from July 8,
2019, through August 6, 2019.
The 2019 legislative session resulted in virtually no oil and
gas legislation being passed, as the Alaska Legislature focused
primarily on legislation regarding the State budget and the funding of
the Permanent Fund Dividend. Despite the uncharacteristic lack of
oil and gas legislation, the Legislature addressed the prevalent issue
of oil and gas leasing in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(“ANWR”) through the passage of Senate Joint Resolution No. 7.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.2
1. George R. Lyle is a shareholder of Guess & Rudd, P.C. and concentrates his
practice in the areas of oil and gas, natural resources, and environmental law. Adam
D. Harki is a shareholder of Guess & Rudd, P.C. and focuses primarily on oil and
gas, litigation defense, banking, and business and commercial law. Traci N. Bunkers
is an associate of Guess & Rudd, P.C., whose practice focuses primarily on civil
litigation, as well as oil and gas and natural resources matters.
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A. Senate Joint Resolution No. 7 (“SJR 7”)
In passing SJR 7, the Legislature resolved to request that the
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) implement an oil and gas leasing program in the coastal plain
of the ANWR.
The Resolution provides that 16 U.S.C. 3143 (sec. 1003 of the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)) and
16 U.S.C. 3142 (sec. 1002 of ANILCA) authorize both oil and gas
development and production and nondrilling exploratory activity
within the coastal plain of the ANWR.2 In passing the SJR 7, the
Legislature noted that the coastal plain of ANWR contains an
estimated 7.687 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 7 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas,3 which could generate over $104 billion in
government revenue from petroleum development.4 SJR 7 further
notes that exploration, development, and production of ANWR is
predicted to generate 1,430 direct and 6,350 indirect jobs annually,
with 2,480 direct and 10,100 indirect jobs at peak employment.5
The Resolution closes with the Legislature’s request that the
BLM take into consideration “the long history of safe and responsible
oil and gas development on Alaska’s North Slope, the enormous
benefits development of oil and gas resources in the coastal plain of
the ANWR would bring to the state and the nation, the advances in
oilfield technology that continue to shrink the impact area of oil and
gas activities, and the support of residents from the North Slope
Borough and across the North Slope of Alaska for oil and gas
development in a portion of the coastal plain.”6
II. CASE LAW
A. Cases of the Supreme Court of Alaska
i. All American Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC7
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
2019).

SJR 7, p.1.
Id., p. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id., p. 3.
All Am. Oilfield, LLC v. Cook Inlet Energy, LLC, 446 P.3d 767 (Alaska
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In 1910, the United States Congress passed Alaska’s first
mineral dump lien statute, which grants laborers a lien against a
“dump or mass” of hard-rock minerals for their work creating the
dump. Alaska’s territorial legislature amended the dump lien statute
in 1933 to include oil and gas development. This amendment has
created the framework for technological advances in Alaska’s oil and
gas industries that has remained largely unchanged.
In All American Oilfield LLC, the Alaska Supreme Court
accepted certified questions from both the United States District
Court and the United States Bankruptcy Court8 regarding the breadth
of the mineral dump lien statute as it applies to natural gas
development:
1.
Can a “dump lien” under Alaska Statute (“AS”)
34.35.125 et seq. apply to gas stored in its natural
reservoir?;
2.
Is a mineral “dump” created under AS 34.35.140 and
AS 34.35.170(a)(1) each time that natural gas is
released from the natural reservoir in which the gas
was formed and transported through a pipeline to the
point of sale?
3.
Must a dump lien claimant under AS 34.35.140 prove,
in order to have a valid dump lien, that the produced
gas was, in whole or in part, the product of her labor?9
a) Un-Extracted Natural Gas Remaining In Its Natural Reservoir
Cannot Constitute A “Dump”
With respect to the first question, the Supreme Court held
that the statutory definition of “dump or mass” reflects that a mineral
dump lien may extend only to gas extracted from its natural
reservoir.10 Under the relevant statutory framework, there must be a
8. The certified questions stem from an adversary proceeding filed by All
American in case of In re Cook Inlet Energy LLC, 2017 WL 1082217 (Bankr. D.
Alaska Mar. 21, 2017), in which All American asked the bankruptcy court to
determine the validity and priority of its secured claims against Cook Inlet, as well
as a district court case in which the trustee for Cook Inlet’s liquidation trust sued
Carol Inman, d/b/a Starichkof Enterprises for payments that Cook Inlet made to her
prior to filing for bankruptcy. See All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 770.
9. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 771.
10. Id., at 773.
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“dump” to which the lien can attach for a claimant to obtain a dump
lien.11
The Court found that the existence of a dump is a condition
precedent to obtaining a dump lien. Under the statute’s plain
meaning, un-extracted gas cannot constitute a dump because it was
never “extracted, hoisted, and raised” as the statutory definition
requires.12
The Supreme Court further found that neither the legislative
history nor the relevant case law interpreting the dump lien statute
extends the statutory definition of “dump” to include any unextracted gas remaining in its natural reservoir.13 Further, affording
the statute its plain meaning does not lead to glaringly absurd
results.14
b) Natural Gas in a Pipeline May Constitute a “Dump”
In ruling on the second certified question, the Supreme Court
found that, because gas in a pipeline has been “extracted, hoisted,
and raised” and is “in mass,” it may constitute a dump if it is located
“adjacent” to the mine or mining claim. However, whether gas is
adjacent to a mine or mining claim must be decided on a case-bycase basis.15
The Court rejected Cook Inlet’s arguments that gas in a
pipeline cannot qualify as a “dump.” Instead, the Court determined
that gas in a pipeline has been “extracted, hoisted, and raised”

11. See AS 34.35.140(a).
12. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 773. See AS 34.35.170(a)(1).
13. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 774, examining Act of June 25, 1910, ch.
422, (creating miner’s labor lien in Alaska territory); 45 Cong. Rec. 4,905 (1910);
Donaldson v. Henning, 4 Alaska 642 (D. Alaska 1913); Nordstrom v. SivertsenJohnsen Mining & Dredging Co., 5 Alaska 204 (D. Alaska 1914); Ch. 79, SLA 1913;
Ch. 13, SLA 1915; Ch. 113, SLA 1933.
14. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 776. In ruling “no” to the first certified
question, the Supreme Court held that All American could not qualify for a dump
lien under AS 34.35.140 because the gas for which All American drilled wells was
not “extracted, hoisted, and raised” from the mine. However, the Court noted that
All American may still obtain a non-preferred mine lien under AS 34.35.125, as the
definition of “mine” or “mining claim” includes “all valuable mineral deposits,
including coal, oil, gas, or other fluid, and all loads, veins, or rock in place containing
minerals.” See AS 34.35.170(a)(3).
15. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 777.
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because it has been “extracted from the soil and brought to the
surface,” and, thus, ceases to be a mineral deposit.16
Alaska Statute 34.35.170(a)(1) also requires gas to be “in
mass” to constitute a dump. The statute provides that a dump is “in
mass . . . whether it is deposited in dumps or piles, or placed in
hoppers, tanks, or reservoirs, or in sluice boxes or bunkers or other
receptacles.”17 Adopting the interpretation that the “whether” clause
of the statute limits the ways that a dump can be “in mass” to the
enumerated examples,18 the Court noted that the only way for natural
gas to be “in mass” would be for it either to be “deposited in dumps
or piles” or “placed in hoppers, tanks, or reservoirs, or in sluice
boxes or bunkers or other receptacles.”19 However, because gas
cannot be deposited into a dump or pile, the determination rests on
whether natural gas pumped out of its natural reservoir into a
pipeline on its way to another destination is “placed” into a
“receptacle” for the statute’s purposes.20
The Court examined the definitions of receptacle, tank, and
hopper, and concluded that pipelines constitute “receptacles.” Even
though the primary purpose of a pipeline is transport, the statute’s
inclusion of “sluice box” indicates that a “receptacle” under the
statute need not only or primarily hold its contents.21 Thus, “[i]n the
process of conveying a gas, pipelines do hold or contain it for a brief
period of time, as a receptacle would.”22 However, whether gas in a
pipeline is “adjacent” to a mine or mining claim, in order to
constitute a dump, requires a “fact-specific inquiry to determine if
16. Id., at 778, citing 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gas and Oil § 4 (2017) (“Gas and oil when
unsevered are a part of the land and after gas and oil are extracted from the soil and
brought to the surface, they are deemed personal property.” (Internal citations
omitted)); see Cont’l Res. of Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Methane, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ill.
App. 2006) (“Oil and gas in place are minerals, but because of their fugacious
qualities, they are incapable of ownership distinct from the soil. . . . Oil and gas are
incapable of ownership until actually found and produced.”).
17. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 778, citing AS 34.35.170(a)(1).
18. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 778, citing Studdert v. Tanana Valley Gold
Dredging Co., 8 Alaska 267, 271 (D. Alaska 1931) (“Clearly, in my judgment, the
Legislature intended, by the use of this language, to refer only to sands, earth, ore,
rock, and minerals which were either deposited in dumps or piles, placed in hoppers
or tanks or in sluice boxes or bunkers, or other receptacles, located in the same
place.”)
19. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 778.
20. Id.
21. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 779.
22. Id.
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the off-mine portions are close enough to be considered ‘adjacent’ to
the mine.”23
c) Produced Gas Must be the Product of the Lienor’s Labor
The Supreme Court answered the final question, whether
dump lien claimants must prove that produced gas is the product of
their labor, in the affirmative. Unlike AS 34.25.125, AS
34.35.140(a) plainly requires that lien claimants make this showing,
providing that the dump lien is “to secure the amount due the laborer
in the production of the minerals.”24 The Supreme Court found that
a laborer may claim and enforce a dump lien by performing any of
the kinds of work mentioned in the dump and mine lien statutes;25
however, whether a particular claimant’s labor meets these
requirements is case-specific and must be left to the trier of fact.26
ii. Kenai Landing, Inc. v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska,
LLC27
In Kenai Landing, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the
Superior Court’s ruling regarding compensation for producible
native gas remaining in a reservoir at the time of a taking, as well as
its valuation of gas storage rights.

23. Id. at 780. The Supreme Court made no rulings with respect to whether the
gas in the pipelines was “adjacent” with respect to All American’s and Inman’s
claims, as neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court made findings about the
exact location and size of the pipelines at issue in those cases. Id.
24. AS 34.35.140(a).
25. See AS 34.35.140(a) (a claimant may be entitled to a dump lien by
performing “any of the kinds of work mentioned in AS 34.35.125” or “any other
kind of work in the production, piling up, or storing of a dump or mass of mineral.”)
See also AS 34.35.12 (identifying the following work entitling a claimant to a mine
lien: opening up, developing, sinking, drilling, drifting, stoping, mucking, stripping,
shoveling, mining, hoisting, firing, cooking, teaming, or perform[ing] any other
class or kind of work necessary or convenient to the development, operation,
working, or mining of the claim or well; . . . perform[ing] work tending to or
assisting in the developing, extraction, separation, or reduction to a commercial
value of the minerals; . . . perform[ing] work on a water right, ditch, flume, pipe line,
tramway, tram, road, or trail, used in connection with the opening up, or to facilitate
the opening up, operation, or development of the claim or well, or the extraction of
the minerals.)
26. All Am. Oilfield, LLC, 446 P.3d at 781.
27. 441 P.3d 954 (Alaska 2019).
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a) Background
The appellee, Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
(“CINGSA”), is a private company that was building a natural gas
facility for storage of natural gas collected from various sites. The
gas is stored by injecting it into a rock formation, known as the
Sterling C Reservoir.28 To facilitate efficient gas extraction, there
must be a minimum amount of pressurization, which requires a
minimum amount of gas in storage, also known as “base” or
“cushion” gas.29 Within the Sterling C Reservoir, some of the base
gas consisted of gas left in the Reservoir when it was acquired by
CINGSA.30
The appellant, Kenai Landing, Inc., owns a parcel of land
overlying the Sterling C Reservoir that was acquired subject to the
Wards Cove Lease (the “Lease”). The Lease is committed to the
Cannery Loop Unit and exists so long as gas is being produced
anywhere in the unit.31
To operate its storage facility, CINGSA filed a condemnation
action to obtain necessary property rights. At the time of filing the
action, the royalty rights under the Lease were held by Wards Cove,
and the production rights were held by Marathon Alaska Production
Company.32 CINGSA negotiated separate agreements with both
Wards Cove and Marathon to obtain their rights as lessor and lessee,
respectively, under the Lease. The Department of Natural Resources
subsequently agreed to sever the Sterling C Reservoir from the
Cannery Loop Unit so that it could be used for storage purposes.33
After CINGSA commenced its condemnation proceeding, it
discovered a “pocket of gas,” which ultimately increased the amount
of native gas in the Reservoir, including the gas underneath Kenai
Landing’s property.34
b) Procedural History

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 957.
Id.
Gas left in the ground is known as “native gas.”
Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 957-58.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
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CINGSA subsequently filed a complaint against Kenai
Landing to condemn certain rights to the Sterling C Reservoir that it
had not already acquired, including: (1) an easement for gas storage,
including any underground formations in the Reservoir, as well as an
adjoining geological zone for use as a “buffer;” and (2) an easement
in the mineral interests, allowing CINGSA the use of “all gas, oil, or
other minerals . . . located within the Sterling C Pool and the
correlative buffer geological formation, including the use of native
gas as base gas for the storage facility.”35
CINGSA subsequently moved for partial summary judgment
on the grounds that Kenai Landing had no right to compensation for
any of the native gas in the Reservoir because CINGSA owned this
gas as assignee of the Lease. Finding that the Lease was still in
effect, the superior court found that Kenai Landing was not entitled
to compensation for native gas and granted summary judgment in
CINGSA’s favor.36
Because the parties agreed that Kenai Landing was entitled to
compensation for the use of its property for underground gas storage,
the superior court held a hearing to value the storage rights and
corresponding valuation. Kenai Landing disputed the superior
court’s valuation and subsequently filed an appeal, in which it: (1)
challenged the superior court’s refusal to compensate it for
CINGSA’s use of native gas; (2) argued that it was entitled to
compensation for the “new” gas discovered by CINGSA after the
taking; and (3) disputed the valuation of its storage rights.37
c) Kenai Landing Was Not Entitled to Compensation for Native Gas
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Kenai
Landing was owed no compensation for the producible native gas
remaining in the Sterling C Reservoir at the time of the taking.
Analyzing the principles of just compensation, the Court determined
that Kenai Landing lost nothing by virtue of CINGSA’s
condemnation of an easement.38 Specifically, because CINGSA
holds both production rights and a royalty interest by virtue of its
assignment under the Wards Cove Lease, Kenai Landing does not
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 958.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 960.
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have the right to produce or receive royalties so long as the Lease
exists.39 CINGSA, “by condemning the easement, gained the use of
the native gas as base gas, but Kenai Landing did not lose anything it
already had.”40
The Supreme Court characterized Kenai Landing’s right to
the gas as reversionary because it had no right to extract native gas,
block its production, or use the native gas for any purpose. As such,
Kenai Landing was not entitled to compensation for any producible
native gas that remained in the Reservoir at the time of the taking.41
d) Kenai Landing Was Not Entitled to Compensation for New Gas
Kenai Landing’s second argument, that it was entitled to
compensation for newly discovered gas, was rendered moot by the
Supreme Court’s ruling that Kenai Landing was not entitled to
compensation for native gas.42
The Court also rejected Kenai Landing’s argument against
the lower court’s use of the “scope of the project” rule, “which holds
that enhancements to the condemned property’s value, arising after it
becomes likely that the property will be condemned, do not benefit
the condemnee.”43 The Court noted that the new gas was not present
until CINGSA accidentally discovered it while working on the
project, and, the scope of the project rule precludes compensation for
the new gas because it was not part of Kenai Landing’s property
when condemnation proceedings began.44
e) The Superior Court Did Not Err in Valuing Kenai Landing’s Pore
Space Rights
Kenai Landing’s remaining arguments on appeal involved the
superior court’s valuation of its storage rights. Kenai Landing
argued that the superior court undervalued these rights by failing to
consider the “highest and best use” of the storage space.45 Instead,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
1984).
44.
45.

Id. at 960-61.
Id. at 961.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 962, citing City of Valdez v. 18.99 Acres, 686 P.2d 682, 689 (Alaska
Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 962.
Id.
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Kenai Landing sought the application of the “fullest extent rule,”
“which presumes that the appropriator will exercise [the rights
acquired] and use and enjoy the property taken to the full extent.”46
However, the Supreme Court found that application of the fullest
extent rule undermines Alaska law on just compensation.
The Court looked to Martens v. State,47 where the Supreme
Court previously held that, when there is “a reasonable probability of
a change in the near future in the zoning ordinance or other
restriction, then the effect of such probability upon the minds of
purchasers generally may be taken into consideration in fixing
present market value.”48 Because the evidence in the record
established that no change in the storage capacity was “reasonably
probable” in the near future, the lower court properly declined to
apply the fullest extent rule as urged by Kenai Landing.49
Kenai Landing also argued that the lower court erred by
including the buffer area in valuing the condemned property.
Specifically, Kenai Landing argued that by assigning equal value to
the buffer area, the superior court diluted the value assigned to the
actual pore space and “punishes [Kenai Landing] based on
CINGSA’s arbitrary determination as to how much non-pore buffer
area to include within its proposed ‘storage boundary.’”50 However,
the Supreme Court found that the superior court included the buffer
area in its valuation as a matter of industry practice after three of
CINGSA’s experts testified that a buffer zone is “required for
prudent operation” of a gas storage field.51 The experts also testified
that a buffer zone is “important to the integrity of a gas field,” and
that “in the industry no difference is made in the leasing rates
applicable to surface land over the reservoir area versus land located
over the buffer area.”52 The Supreme Court likewise upheld the
lower court’s reliance on one of CINGSA’s expert’s with respect to
the actual value of the storage space.53

46. Id. at 963, citing Coos Bay Logging Co. v. Barclay, 159 Ore. 272, 79 P.2d
672, 677 (Or. 1938).
47. 554 P.2d 407, 409 (Alaska 1976).
48. Id.
49. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 963-64.
50. Id. at 964.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Kenai Landing, LLC, 441 P.3d at 965.
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B. Cases of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska
i. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump54
In League of Conservation Voters, the United States Court for
the District of Alaska considered the scope of a President’s authority
under Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(“OCSLA”), finding that Section 12(a) does not endow the President
with the authority to revoke withdrawals of unleased land from the
Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”).55
a) Background
OCSLA was enacted in 1953 with two purposes: (1) “[t]o
provide for the jurisdiction of the United States over” OCS lands;56
and (2) “to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease such lands
for certain purposes.”57 Section 12(a) of the OCSLA provides: “The
President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw
from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental
Shelf.”58
Plaintiffs59 sued the federal defendants60 for an alleged
violation of the Constitution’s Property Clause, as well as an alleged
violation of the statutory authority endowed by Section 12(a) of
OCSLA, after President Trump issued Executive Order 13795,61
intended to revoke three memoranda and one executive order issued
by President Obama in 2015 and 2016 withdrawing certain areas of
54. 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019).
55. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1030-1031.
56. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953).
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 12(a), 67 Stat. 462, 469 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)).
59. Plaintiffs included the League of Conservation Voters, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club, Alaska Wilderness League, Defenders of Wildlife,
Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Resisting Environmental Destruction on
Indigenous Lands, Center for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, Inc., and The
Wilderness Society.
60. The federal defendants included Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as
President of the United States, Ryan Zinke, in his official capacity as Secretary of
the Interior, Wilbur Ross in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce,
American Petroleum Institute, Intervenor Defendant, and State of Alaska, Intervenor
Defendant. Guess and Rudd, P.C. represented Intervenor Defendant, American
Petroleum Institute.
61. See Exec. Order 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815, §§ 4(c), 5 (Apr. 28, 2017).
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the Outer Continental Shelf from leasing.62
b) The Statutory Text of Section 12(a)
On the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the Court
examined both the plain text of Section 12(a) and the context in
which it was enacted.63 In examining the plain language of Section
12(a), the Court noted that, while the text of Section 12(a) expressly
grants the President the authority to withdraw unleased lands from
the OCS, it does not expressly grant to the President the authority to
revoke prior withdrawals.
However, the statute’s inclusion of the phrase “from time to
time” created ambiguity.64 Specifically, the phrase could be
interpreted in two ways: (1) “to make clear the President’s authority
to make withdrawals at any time and for discrete periods of time, as
well as make withdrawals that extend indefinitely into the future
unless and until revoked by Congress;” or (2) “to accord to each
President the authority to revoke or modify any prior withdrawal.”65
In light of the ambiguity created by the language of Section 12(a),
the Court examined context of Section 12(a) in order to discern
Congress’s intent.66
c) The Context of Section 12(a)
In considering the context of Section 12(a), the Court
analyzed the structure of OCSLA, OCLSA’s legislative history and
prior statutes, the purposes of OCSLA, and OCSLA’s subsequent
legislative history.

62. See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States
Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska From Leasing Disposition,
DCPD201500059 (Jan. 27, 2015); Exec. Order 13754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90669, § 3
(Dec. 9, 2016); Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United
States Arctic Outer Continental Shelf From Mineral Leasing, DCPD201600860
(Dec. 20, 2016); Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas off the Atlantic
Coast on the Outer Continental Shelf From Mineral Leasing, DCPD201600861
(Dec. 20, 2016).
63. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1018.
64. Id. at 1024.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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1. The Structure of OCSLA
With respect to structure, the Court compared Section 12(a)
with Section 8. Section 8 of OCSLA, titled “Leasing of Outer
Continental Shelf,” authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease
OCS lands “[i]n order to meet the urgent need for further exploration
and development of the oil and gas deposits” beneath the OCS.67
Section 12 of the Act, as enacted in 1953, was titled “Reservations.”
Most of the provisions of that section address restrictions on the
private use of OCS lands, and no subsection expands private sector
use of these lands.68 Contrasting the two sections, the Court found
that Section 8 was intended to promote leasing, while Section 12(a)
is “entirely protective,”69 stating, “Interpreting OCSLA to promote
expeditious leasing in Section 8, but according to the President
authority to prohibit leasing in specified areas in Section 12(a), gives
effect to all of OCSLA’s provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”70 Accordingly,
OCSLA’s structure promotes the view that Section 12(a) did not
grant revocation authority to the President.”71
2. The Legislative History of OCSLA
In evaluating the legislative history of Section 12(a), the
Court rejected the federal defendants’ assertion that, because the
President has the authority to revoke withdrawals on uplands,
Section 12(a) similarly vests the President with the authority to
revoke withdrawals of unleased lands on the OCS. The defendants
relied on Senate Report No. 83-4, in which the Committee on
Interior and Consular Affairs stated that “it was vesting withdrawal
authority ‘comparable to that which is vested in [the President] with
respect to federally owned lands on the uplands.’”72 The Court
67. Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 8(a), 67 Stat. 462, 468 (1953) (current version at 43
U.S.C. § 1337).
68. Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 12(a)-(f), 67 Stat. 462, 469-70 (1953) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1341).
69. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1025.
70. Id. at 1026 (internal citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1025, citing S. Rep. No.
83-411, at 26 (1953).
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ultimately held that “Congress’s silence in Section 12(a) as to
according the President revocation authority was likely purposeful;
had Congress intended to grant the President revocation authority, it
could have done so explicitly, as it had previously done in several
(but not all) of its previously enacted uplands laws.73 The Court also
held that Attorney General opinions further establish that Congress
intended to authorize the President only to withdraw OCS lands from
leasing in Section 12(a).74 The Court further rejected the argument
that the deletion of a provision limiting withdrawal authority from a
prior version of Section 12(a) signaled authority to revoke
withdrawals, asserting that the deletion afforded the President more
discretion in making withdrawals but did not endow the President
with the authority to revoke any of those withdrawals.75
3. The Purposes of OCSLA
Turning to the purposes of OCSLA, the Court focused on the
second purpose of OCSLA—”to authorize the Secretary of the
Interior to lease [OCS] lands for certain purposes.”76 The Court
noted that, while Congress “clearly sought more leasing,” it did not
seek “unbridled leasing,” given that OCSLA was to “be construed in
such manner that the character as high seas of the waters above the
outer Continental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing
therein shall not be affected.”77 The Court also noted that Congress’s
inclusion of Section 12—”Reservations”—was also intended to limit
leasing activity:
The fact that Congress expressly granted the
President the authority to withdraw OCS lands
from leasing, but did not expressly grant the
President the authority to revoke such
withdrawals, is not inconsistent with the second
purpose of OCSLA as enacted in 1953,
particularly as Congress itself retained the
73. Id. at 1027.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1028.
76. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953).
77. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1028, citing Pub. L. No.
83-212, Section 3(b), 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953).
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authority to revoke prior presidential
withdrawals pursuant to the Property Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.78
The Court rejected the federal defendants’ contention such an
interpretation would allow a President to permanently withdraw the
entire OCS from exploration and development, absent intervention
from Congress. Looking to prior Attorney General opinions, the
Court found that, “Congress has previously authorized the President
to tie future Presidents’ hands.”79 While Section 12(a) technically
allows a President to permanently withdraw all unleased lands on the
OCS, the Court noted that Congress could reverse such an action by
either revoking the withdrawal itself or amending Section 12(a) to
expressly allow a President to revoke a prior presidential
withdrawal.80
4. The Subsequent History of OCSLA
Finally, in considering OCSLA’s subsequent history, the
Court held that Congress’s decisions not to challenge prior
revocations did not meet the “high bar required to constitute
acquiescence.”81 In addition, Congress’s lack of action regarding
Section 12(a) did not allow the Court to draw any appropriate
inference that would “override” the Court’s interpretation of Section
12(a) based on the section’s language and legislative history prior to
its enactment.82
Based on the context in which Section 12(a) was enacted, the
Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring
the revocation of Executive Order 13795 invalid and unlawful and
vacating Section 5 of the Order.83 The defendants have since filed

78. League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1029.
79. Id. at 1029.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1030, citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469-71
(1915) (holding that presidential withdrawal of public lands was lawful because
Congress had “uniformly and repeatedly acquiesced” to the President’s creation of
roughly 250 reservations).
82. Id. (internal citations omitted).
83. Id. at 1030-31.
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notices of appeal with respect to the Court’s ruling.84

84. See Notice of Appeal by Wilbur Ross, Donald J. Trump, Ryan Zinke,
League of Conservation Voters et al v. Trump et al, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D.
Alaska May 28, 2019); Notice of Appeal by American Petroleum Institute, League
of Conservation Voters et al v. Trump et al, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska
May 28, 2019); Notice of Appeal by State of Alaska, League of Conservation
Voters et al v. Trump et al, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska May 28, 2019).

